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Military Improvements. Although Iraq has been unable to reverse the overall decline in military capability, it has made some important advances:
Iraq is diverting vehicles imported under the UN oil-for-food (OFF)
with these vehicles, it will be three to five years before Baghdad can resolve its military transportation shortage.
 Iraq is supporting its military and WMD programs with limited amounts of dual-use goods acquired through the OFF program and—in some cases—with embargoed materials.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
Saddam's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction an addiction. Saddam believes such weapons are vital to deter longtime adversaries Iran, Israel, and the US, as well as to showcase Iraq's—and the Arab world's—scientific prowess and military potency.
Biological weapons program. Iraq maintains an active and capable BW program that includes research, production, and weaponization of BW agents. BW agents, anthrax and botulinum toxin. We assess these two agents are the most probable candidates for Iraqi weaponization, but other agents such as smallpox and plague remain a serious concern. We
assess the program is currently capable of producing thousands of liters of anthrax and botulinum toxin agent
Credible, but unconfirmed, sensitive reporting indicates that Iraq since 1997 has been producing BW agents using mobile laboratories. Iraq maintains or has reconstituted several dual-use facilities capable of producing even more BW agents.
Chemical weapons program. Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing dual-use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plants. It is trying to procure CW-related items. We judge Iraq is most likely to produce
mustard, sarin, GF, or VX if agent production is ordered.

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The Terrorist Threat from Iraq
Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. Over several decades, Baghdad has evolved from an indiscriminate sponsor of anti-Western terrorism to more narrowly focused efforts, targeting primarily Saddam's political opponents—including his attempt to assassinate former President Bush in 1993—and, secondarily, local regional foes
Baghdad continues to provide safehaven, financial support, and low-level terrorist training to a number of terrorist groups. It also has worked to rebuild intelligence networks abroad to increase its capability to work against Western interests, procure weapons, and further penetrate and undermine its opposition. Iraq is intensifying its contingency planning activities for attacks on US or Western targets—a likely response to US attacks against Iraq.
Iraq continues to support to varying degrees the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Arab Liberation Front, and the Abu Nidal Organization, which appears to be rebuilding with help from Iraq



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The Iraqi Threat	
Saddam sees himself as a pan-Arab leader and views his regime as the most glorion history. Nurtured in a clannish, nationalist, and cutthroat political environment, Saddam anti-Western outlook colors his domestic and foreign policies. His decisionmaking is gopportunism, distrust of others, a personal need for power, and the sense that he is an houst take bold risks to advance Iraq's interests. He views state power primarily in militatunching wars against neighbors—and his strategic aim is to establish Iraq as the preent the Persian Gulf.	n's parochial, uided by istoric figure who tary terms—twice
 He views the US and Israel as the chief impediments to his dominating the rest they want to divide and weaken the Arabs and control their oil resources. 	gion and believes
Saddam's Threat to His People	
Saddam maintains a vise grip on Iraq through his multilayered and pervasive secur which brutally enforces his authority and cultivates an image of invincibility. Throughous presidency, Saddam has ruthlessly eliminated real and imagined adversaries to further and consolidate his power. He has ordered the assassination of numerous domestic rivacolleagues, family members, and dissidents in Iraq and abroad.	out his 22-year his political goals
Saddam's obsession with ensuring regime security by force has led to repeated and counterinsurgency operations. operations against the Shia opposition in southern Iraq in 1991. His forces leveled num killed tens of thousands, and displaced thousands more. — He has overseen the destruction of Iraq's large marshlands and displaced their	erous villages,
opponents and insurgents a hiding place.	,
As commander-in-chief during the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam was responsible for the recommendation of the influence of the recommendation of the included mass deportations, resettlement, torture, executions, and the use of cherocher iraq is Government razed hundreds of Kurdish villages and forcibly relocated the distribution southern Iraq.	id in 1987-88, mical weapons.
Saddam's Human Shields	
The Iraqi regime uses people as pawns and hostages. It has taken Iraqi citizens, printerigners as "human shields" to protect key political and military sites, most notably owar.	

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Saddam has spent all but three years of his long tenure at war with his neighbors and the internation munnity, squandering Iraq's vast oil and other resources in the process. He believes a large eventional military is essential to making Iraq a great power. The Iraqi military today is less than half its pre-Gulf war size, and Baghdad's military capabilities re deteriorated slowly as a result of UN sanctions, the arms embargo, and damage inflicted by alition and US military operations. Iraq has received no major military equipment—such as tanks, Cs, artillery, or aircraft—since the imposition of the arms embargo, and damage inflicted by alition and US military operations. Iraq has received no major military equipment—such as tanks, Cs, artillery, or aircraft—since the imposition of the arms embargo in 1990. It is importing increasin ounts of illieti spare parts and dual-use items, but these shipments are only sufficient to slow, not crese, the overall decline in military capabilities. Despite these shortcomings, the Iraqi military retain capacity to threaten US interests, and the Intelligence Community assesses it capable of: Defeating any combination of internal opposition groups and reasserting regime control over key roads and cities in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Overrunning Kuwait—absent opposition from Western forces—and threatening other regiona Arab states. **Neventional Forces in Decline**. Iraq maintains 23 divisions in its ground forces, down from the high of just before Operation Desert Storm. The six Republican Guard divisions remain the most capable ground force units The key vulnerability for the ground forces remains logistics, leaving them dependent on the national rail network for movement in the country and limiting power projection capability bevond Iraq's borders. The Iraqi Air Force has only 200 or so mission-capable fighter aircraft, and training sorties have beined steadily since the end of the Gulf War. Morale among pilots remains low some pilots must take second jobs or eng	TOP SECRET
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	Baghdad continues work on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that it could a dissemination device for BW agents or, less likely, chemical agents. Iraq also could use missile ds, aerial bombs, and spray tanks already in its arsenal as other means to deliver BW agents. From 1995 until at least October of last year, Iraq's UAV effort was focused on converting L-29 aircraft—out-of-production Czech jet trainers—to UAVs that could be used as BW/CW delivery
d-p	warket. Systems. Iraq is nearing deployment of its two UN-authorized ballistic missiles—the propellant Al Samoud SRBM and the solid-propellant Ababil-100 SRBM—and continues to longer-range, ballistic missile capabilities.
	tolerance 7075-T6 aluminum tubes was destined for use in Iraqi gas centrifuges. We have not detected a dedicated Iraqi effort to obtain fissile material from abroad, but Baghdad could produce a crude nuclear weapon within a year if it obtains fissile material on the black
-	by late this decade, assuming it produces the necessary components indigenously. This time frame could be shortened to mid-decade if Iraq obtains significant foreign assistance or has clandestinely built the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. We believe a shipment of high
-	Procurement activities detected within the past year show Iraq is trying to jump-start a clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the fissile material for a weapon, potentially
	a significant number of nuclear program scientists, program documentation, and, probably, the cturing infrastructure to support a reinvigorated nuclear weapons program.

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